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COMMENT
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND CERTIFICATES OF APPEALABILITY IN
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
Matthew Hughes†
ABSTRACT
In modern federal habeas corpus proceedings, petitioners must overcome
numerous substantive and procedural barriers to relief. To appeal a district
court’s final order disposing of a habeas petition, habeas petitioners must first
obtain permission in the form of a certificate of appealability (COA), which
must specify the issues certified for appeal. In the relatively rare event that a
court grants a COA, the habeas petitioner might wish to appeal one or more
evidentiary rulings. This article argues that evidentiary issues directly related
to substantive claims certified for appeal need not be specified in the COA to
be appealed. Like the motion for appointment of counsel in the Supreme Court
decision Harbison v. Bell, evidentiary rulings are nonfinal orders not subject
to the COA requirement unless they fall within the scope of the collateral order
doctrine. The practical effect of such an interpretation is to force courts of
appeal to do what they already have the discretion to do: thoroughly and
carefully review every lower court evidentiary ruling related to a substantive
claim that has been certified for appeal.
I. INTRODUCTION
It used to be the fashion for high-ranking government officials to arrest
their personal and political enemies and hold them indefinitely. In some
places, it still is. But people have got hold of two notions: that a person ought
not to be punished or imprisoned unless the person has done something
wrong, and that even a person who has done wrong cannot be justly punished
or imprisoned unless society has made it clear, upfront, that the act in
question is wrong and subject to punishment. The idea of the rule of law, an
ancient Jewish idea that became stylish eight hundred years ago in England,
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was combined with these two notions. Together, they were embodied in the
Magna Carta and the writs of habeas corpus.1
A writ of habeas corpus is a written, judicial demand—a court order—
directing the custodian (jailer) of a person in custody (prisoner) to deliver the
body of the prisoner for a particular purpose. Historically, the purpose was
generally to investigate whether the authorities imprisoned him2 lawfully
and, if not, to have him released. “Habeas” or “habeas corpus” in the modern
federal context refers to a state or federal prisoner (the petitioner) challenging
a state or federal conviction or sentence (or both) in federal court by claiming
the conviction or sentence (or both) violates the laws, treaties, or
Constitution of the United States. Federal prisoners may apply for the writ
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.3 In rare
cases, state and federal prisoners can apply for the writ under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 and thereby escape the strictures of §§ 2254 and 2255. These and related
provisions are generally referred to as the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
† Matthew Hughes is a second-year JD candidate at Liberty University School of Law.
Special thanks are due to Judge Alice Batchelder of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, who
graciously allowed me to extern in her chambers. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Yvette
Gerhard, who made the logistics of the externship possible and my stay very pleasant, and to
Chris Curtin and Pierce Babirak, my supervising clerks. They assigned me the task of writing
a general memorandum of law, allowed me to choose federal habeas corpus as the topic, and
provided general guidance and some specific help. With the permission of Judge Batchelder,
that memorandum became the foundation of this article and parts of it comprise much of the
content of Part I and Sections II.A–D. Thanks are also due to Professor Stephen Rice, who
showed me what disciplined legal thinking looks like, Judge Paul Spinden, who always enjoys
an abstract conversation, and the other professors who have shaped my thinking. Most
importantly, thank you to my parents, Alan and Elaine Hughes, who made me learn how to
teach myself.
1. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 37–38 (1985); see also Phillip D. Kline, Imprisoning the Innocent: The
Knowledge of Law Fiction, 12 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 393, 435 (2018) (citations omitted); infra notes
16–22 and accompanying text.
2. For convenience and because the vast majority of federal and state prisoners are males,
this article employs masculine pronouns throughout. Inmate Gender, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS (Jan. 25, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_gender.jsp;
Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2017, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Apr. 2019), https://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji17.pdf.
3. This article is exclusively dedicated to federal habeas law. A number of states have habeas
corpus laws, and all have some form of postconviction relief, but they are addressed here only
in passing.
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This article argues that under AEDPA, if a substantive claim has been
certified for appeal, evidentiary rulings directly related to the substantive
claim may also be appealed even if the court did not expressly specify whether
the evidentiary rulings were included in the certificate. This principle applies
to all nonfinal habeas orders not covered by the collateral order doctrine. But
this article—while drawing on cases that deal with nonfinal orders not
dealing with evidentiary matters—argues specifically for the application of
this principle to evidentiary rulings.
Tens of thousands of prisoners have litigated AEDPA’s complex
provisions, but interpreting federal habeas law is an intricate business. In
addition to the semantic ambiguity on the fringe of nearly every statute, a
critical component of federal habeas procedure under AEDPA remains
obscure. Harbison v. Bell4 dealt with federal funds for habeas petitioners, but
in order to reach that issue the Court had to decide whether a certificate of
appealability was required for the petitioner to appeal that issue.5 The Court
held it was not.6 The federal courts of appeal are largely unaware that the
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(3)7 underlying Harbison applies to
the relationship of evidentiary motions to substantive habeas claims on
appeal.8 Legal scholars have failed to explore the issue, and few petitioners

4. 556 U.S. 180 (2009).
5. Id. at 182.
6 Id.
7. The provision reads as follows:
(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability,
an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the
detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State
court; or
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate
which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph
(2).
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(3) (2012).
8. See infra, Section II.D.1.
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appear to have litigated it.9 This lack of scholarly treatment is remarkable
because habeas petitioners covet additional opportunities to plead their case
and present a sympathetic story. Because AEDPA’s drafters designed the law
to streamline habeas proceedings and bolster the finality of habeas decisions,
the statute includes numerous obstacles to relief and to appeals. 10 Any chink
in AEDPA’s armor, especially a chance to present new evidence, is another
chance at freedom.
Part II explains the federal habeas statutory framework, including its
provisions on evidentiary matters and appeals. It also discusses the dearth of
legal scholarship and the disjointed federal appellate approaches to habeas
evidentiary rulings on appeal. Part III notes the decision in Harbison v. Bell
and the reasons underlying Harbison’s cursory ruling that where a
substantive claim subject to AEDPA is certified for appeal under §
2253(c)(1)–(3), related evidentiary rulings may be appealed even if the
certificate does not expressly include them. The remainder of Part III briefly
explores the practical benefits of this interpretation to habeas petitioners.
II. BACKGROUND
In twenty-first-century America, the Suspension Clause of the U.S.
Constitution secures the writ: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”11 The Suspension Clause secures the writ as it
existed in 1789.12 But the Clause does not, by itself, give courts authority to
wield the writ. Instead, it requires Congress to authorize federal courts to
grant the writ and allows Congress to decide the exact scope of the writ and
the procedures for habeas petitions.13 The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted
federal courts authority to issue writs of habeas corpus.14 Laws passed in the
intervening centuries have modified, supplemented, and reformed federal

9. See infra, Section II.D.2.
10. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 59 CORNELL L. REV. 259 (2006);
see also infra note 101
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
12. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008).
13. Felkner v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996).
14. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82 (1789) (subsequently amended and
superseded); Felkner, 518 U.S. at 659.
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habeas law. The most important of these is the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).15
A.

General Principles of Habeas Corpus

Modern federal courts recognize three forms of the writ: the writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum, the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, and the
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum directs the prisoner’s jailer to bring the prisoner to court to
testify.16 Another interesting species of the genus habeas corpus is the writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the proper use of which is to obtain the
presence of the erstwhile, imprisoned accused so that he can be tried.17
The garden variety of the writ of habeas corpus is the writ of habeas corpus
ad subjiciendum. By issuing it, a court demands that the body of the prisoner
be produced, generally for an evidentiary hearing or release. The writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum also goes by the moniker of the Great Writ.18
It is this form of the writ to which the phrase “habeas corpus” typically
refers.19 The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is the subject of this article
and the primary version of the writ addressed by AEDPA.
At present, Congress has not extended the writ beyond those to whom it
absolutely must. The Suspension Clause is the clause of the Constitution
guaranteeing that the writ of habeas corpus may not be suspended unless the
public safety requires it on account of war or rebellion.20 The Suspension
Clause applies to those in United States territory.21 For example, the
Suspension Clause applies to prisoners in Michigan and not prisoners in
Luxembourg. Less obviously, it applies to detainees at Guantanamo Bay and

15. Pub. L. No. 104-132 (as codified in part and as amended in scattered subsections of 28
U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253–2255, and 2261–2266 (2012)). Some portions of the law were designed
to deter terrorism. William Diaz, Dualist, but Not Divergent: Evaluating United States
Implementation of the 1267 Sanctions Regime, 5 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 333, 349 & n.88 (2011).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2012); United States v. McGaha, 205 F. Supp. 949, 950 nn.1–2
(E.D. Tenn. 1962) (citing Cuckovich v. United States, 170 F.2d 89, 90 (6th Cir. 1948)).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2012); Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 615 (1961).
18. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474 n.6 (1976) (citing Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 95
(1807) (Marshall, C.J.)).
19. Id.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
21. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008).
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may apply to others in American custody outside the United States based
upon a three-factor test.22
B.

General AEDPA Provisions

By petitioning for the writ under AEDPA, a petitioner asks a federal court
to find that his conviction or sentence (or both)23 was imposed in violation
of the Constitution or a federal law or treaty. The petition must meet several
basic procedural requirements and must satisfy specific substantive
standards. Petitions by prisoners under a death sentence are subject to special
procedures and substantive requirements.24
1.

Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court, any Supreme Court justice, any district court, or any
circuit judge may issue writs of habeas corpus “within [their] respective
jurisdictions.”25 A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court26 must apply to the federal district court for the state in which he is held

22. Id. at 766–71; see also Lauren Easter Lynch, Note, Avoiding Judicial Second-Guessing in
a Nontraditional Theatre of War, 12 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 105, 109–11, 122–23 (2017) (citations
omitted); Benjamin S. White, Note, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama: Must Eliminating Dangerous
Terrorists Entail Accepting Dangerous Political Doctrines, 8 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 411, 432–35
(2014) (citations omitted).
23. The prisoner might accept his conviction but quibble with a lengthy sentence.
24. Sections 2261–2266 apply to death penalty cases. When entertaining an application for
the writ of habeas corpus under §§ 2261–2266, the district court may only consider claims
raised and decided on the merits in the state courts, unless the failure to raise the claim is the
result of state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the result
of the Supreme Court’s recognition of a new federal right that is made retroactively applicable,
or based on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence in time to present the claim for state or federal post-conviction review. 28 U.S.C.
2264(a) (2012). Claims adjudicated on the merits in state courts are reviewed by the district
courts pursuant to the standards in §§ 2254(a), (d), and (e). 28 U.S.C. § 2264(b) (2012). See
Section II.B.3. The federal court presumes state-court factual findings are correct, but the
prisoner may rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)
(2012).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2012). Bankruptcy courts cannot issue the writ. In re Kerr, No.
1530531, 2016 WL 15-78758, at *2–3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio April 15, 2016).
26. This includes nearly every state prisoner. But a federal prisoner simultaneously serving
both a federal and a state sentence may challenge the state sentence via a petition for federal
habeas relief. See Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d 1136, 1141 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Supreme
Court and Tenth Circuit precedents).
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or the district in which he was convicted.27 A person in federal custody must
apply to the federal district court in the district in which he is held.28 Once
the application is taken up by the federal district court, the district court
retains jurisdiction but the petition could become moot if the prisoner is
released.29
2.

Custody

The person seeking the writ must be “in custody.”30 “The custody
requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the writ of
habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty.”31 A
person is in custody if he is subject to conditions that “significantly restrain
[one’s] liberty to do those things which in this country free [persons] are
entitled to do.”32 Prisoners are in custody. Parolees are in custody if the
government exercises direct control over their movements. 33 Because of the

27. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (2012). If the prisoner may choose between multiple district courts,
the district court that receives his application may, “in the exercise of its discretion and in
furtherance of justice,” transfer it to another district court with jurisdiction. Id.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2012). If he applies to the Supreme Court, a Supreme Court justice,
or a circuit judge, he must explain why. Section 2241(e), which denied federal courts
jurisdiction to hear or consider applications filed by or on behalf of an alien who is an enemy
combatant, was declared unconstitutional. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008).
There are special limits on the ability of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to illegal
aliens. Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2018). This area of habeas corpus practice
is influenced by current political agitation on the question of immigration and by the
intricacies of administrative law. This area of the law is constantly in flux due to decisions
overturning statutes, proposed legislation, amendments to existing legislation, and widespread
and ongoing appellate litigation.
29. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). The Supreme Court has been quite clear
that a petitioner “may not collaterally attack his prior conviction” either through a writ of
habeas corpus or through a motion under § 2255, except in cases of violation of the Sixth
Amendment by failure to appoint counsel, but he may challenge a sentence enhanced on the
basis of a faulty prior conviction or, in some cases, a sentence yet to be served. Steverson v.
Summers, 258 F.3d 520, 522–24 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Supreme Court decisions). This is
because he is not “in custody” under the prior sentence.
30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2255(a) (2012). In limited circumstances, next friend habeas
petitions are acceptable.
31. Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).
32. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
33. See id. For example, no court of appeals has held that sex offender registration
requirements constitute custody. Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 2018).
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custody requirement, a petitioner may rarely challenge a conviction or
sentence under which he is not currently imprisoned.34
3.

Petition

A petition for habeas corpus is a request that the court grant the writ. No
federal judge or court is authorized to entertain an application for the writ of
habeas corpus except “on the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”35
Therefore, a court may only grant the writ on the basis of a claim previously
adjudicated on the merits in a state court if the adjudication resulted either
in a “decision contrary to or involving an unreasonable application of clearly
established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or in a “decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

34. Persons detained awaiting state trial are not detained “pursuant to a judgment of a State
court,” and may therefore apply for the writ under § 2241. A prisoner who could petition for
relief under § 2255 may request the writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 if a motion under §
2255 “appears . . . inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,” even if he
neglected to make a motion under § 2255 or he made the motion and the court denied it. 28
U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012); Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 1999). This savings
clause applies “only where the petitioner . . . demonstrates ‘actual innocence.’” Wooten v.
Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012). An example would be where the Supreme Court
narrowly construes a statutory prohibition previously interpreted broadly by the courts of
appeal, which allows some prisoners to claim that they are innocent under the new
interpretation. Petitions filed solely under § 2241 “are not subject to the heightened standards
contained in § 2254(d), [so the court] must conduct a de novo review of the state court
proceedings.” Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, 668 F.3d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 2012).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).
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in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.”36 Courts
frequently refer to this standard as “AEDPA deference.”37
A federal prisoner who claims a right to be released because his sentence
is subject to collateral attack may move the court which imposed the sentence
to vacate, set aside, or correct it.38 The court must grant relief if the sentencing
court lacked jurisdiction, “the sentence imposed was not authorized by law
or is otherwise open to collateral attack,” or the judgment is rendered
vulnerable to collateral attack by virtue of “a denial or infringement of the
[prisoner’s] constitutional rights.”39 Appropriate relief under the statute
consists of vacating, setting aside, or correcting the sentence. 40 Relief is only
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). Ineffective assistance of counsel during federal or state
collateral post-conviction proceedings (such as for habeas relief) is not sufficient grounds for
relief in a proceeding arising under § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2012). “Law is clearly
established when Supreme Court precedent unambiguously provides a controlling legal
standard.” Blackston v. Rapelje, 780 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Regarding the phrase “unreasonable application”: “AEDPA does
not ‘require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a
legal rule must be applied’ . . . . [E]ven a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable
manner.” Id. (citation omitted). A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it
“arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law”
or “arrives a result opposite” that of a Supreme Court case dealing with facts which are
“materially indistinguishable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
The Supreme Court has held that the second prong “imposes a highly deferential
standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given
the benefit of the doubt.” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (citation and internal
quotations omitted). Federal courts presume that state-court factual findings are correct, but
the petitioner may rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1). Even where a state court violated the prisoner’s constitutional rights, he is not
entitled to habeas relief if the error was harmless (i.e., not prejudicial).
37. E.g., Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir 2006); see also Joseph S. Hamrick,
Florida’s Drug Statute, Mens Rea, and Due Process, 7 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 175, 178 (2013) (noting
the importance of AEDPA deference to comparing federal and state precedent interpreting
the Constitution) (citations omitted). If the state court did not rule on the claim’s merits, as
happens in rare circumstances, the federal court reviews the claim de novo. Cone v. Bell, 556
U.S. 449, 472 (2009).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012). Several specific grounds for collateral attack are listed in
the statute: the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, and the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2012).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).
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available when “the claimed error of law was a fundamental defect which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice . . . [and] presents
exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy . . . is apparent.” 41
4.

Exhaustion of State Remedies

State prisoners generally must exhaust potential remedies in state court
before bringing the claim in federal court. The court must deny the writ
unless (1) the applicant has exhausted his state court remedies, (2) no state
corrective process is available to the petitioner, or (3) the corrective process
would be “ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.”42 Because the last
two situations are quite rare, the exhaustion requirement is almost
universal.43 If the petitioner did not exhaust all his state remedies, the court
may nevertheless deny the application on the merits.44 In practical terms, the
exhaustion requirement almost always bars a state prisoner from raising a
ground for federal habeas relief that he did not raise in the state court

41. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
43. Inordinate delay by a state court is one of the rare categories of circumstances the
federal courts have found to be an exception to the exhaustion requirement. See Phillips v.
White, 851 F.3d 567, 574–76 (6th Cir. 2017). The state can only waive or be estopped from
asserting the exhaustion requirement by the state’s attorneys expressly waiving it. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(3) (2012).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2012).
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system.45 The applicant has not exhausted all available state remedies if he
raises a question that he has the right to raise under the law of the state.46
5.

Second or Successive Petitions

A person in custody may file a second or successive application for the writ
of habeas corpus in federal court in only exceptional circumstances.47 The
applicant cannot file a second or successive petition under § 2254 (governing
petitioners under a state court judgment) without first obtaining an order
from the appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to
consider the application.48 A circuit judge or district judge may dismiss a
45. Generally, federal courts cannot consider claims that are procedurally defaulted.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977). Judgments based on state law grounds, whether
substantive or procedural, preclude habeas relief where the state law grounds are “independent
of” federal law and are “adequate to support the judgment,” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 729 (1991) (abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)), unless
the prisoner shows “cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.”
Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10. In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that procedural default of an
ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC) claim on account of failure to raise it in state
collateral (post-conviction) proceedings could be excused if the petitioner did not have
effective assistance of counsel during the collateral proceedings. Id. The Martinez-Trevino
exception applies to IATC claims where the state either “denies permission to raise the claim
on direct appeal” or “grants permission but . . . denies meaningful opportunity” for direct
review of the claim. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 429 (2013).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2012). This rule has also been expressed in the following terms:
“The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the highest court in the state in which the
petitioner was convicted has been given a full and fair opportunity to rule on the petitioner’s
claims.” Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485, 501 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Federal courts “will not review claims that were not entertained by the state
court due to . . . the petitioner's failure to raise those claims in the state courts while state
remedies were available.” Irick v. Bell, 565 F.3d 315, 323–24 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original).
47. A state prisoner can raise a claim in a second or successive application for the writ of
habeas corpus under § 2254 if he shows that his claim relies on a new and previously
unavailable rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on
collateral review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2012). He can also raise a claim in a successive
petition if he proves that he could not have discovered the factual predicate for the claim
previously through the exercise of due diligence and that the facts underlying the claim would
be sufficient to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant guilty apart from constitutional error. 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(2)(B) (2012).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2012). The court must determine the motion 30 days after
it is filed and can only grant it if the application makes a prima facie showing that it satisfies
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second or successive application for relief by a federal prisoner under § 2255
(governing petitioners under a federal court judgment) if the legality of the
detention has already been determined on a prior application.49 A second or
successive motion under either § 2254 or § 2255 can only be heard if the
appropriate court of appeals certifies that the motion meets the substantive
requirements for second or successive habeas petitions under § 2244.50
C.

AEDPA Procedures

A petition institutes a new civil proceeding that is neither a stage in a
criminal proceeding nor an appeal from a criminal proceeding.51 A court’s
issuing the writ is a legal remedy.52 Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the writ of habeas corpus is not available to overturn a federal civil
judgment.53 Unlike a direct appeal and unlike a writ for error coram nobis, by
which a higher court directs a lower court to take notice of facts previously
ignored, the proceeding instigated by an application for the writ of habeas
corpus is separate from the proceeding being challenged.54 The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure generally apply to habeas proceedings, but there are
special legislatively enacted rules of habeas procedure. The habeas
evidentiary rules are discussed below.

the substantive requirements. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(B)–(C) (2012). If a petitioner has
already filed a petition, his subsequent petition is not “second or successive” if the prior
application was not disposed of on the merits. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000)
(holding that dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies is not dismissal on the merits and
therefore does not render a subsequent petition “second or successive”).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (2012).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012).
51. Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978) (superseded on other grounds
by Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
(2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-governing-section-2254-andsection-2255-proceedings.pdf, as recognized in Ukawabutu v. Morton, 997 F. Supp. 605
(D.N.J. 1998)).
52. Adderly v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389, 402 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
54. Several federal circuit courts have expressly held that if a federal prisoner mislabels his
petition as one for the writ of error coram nobis, it can be properly treated as a motion for
relief under § 2255. Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 528 n.1 (4th Cir. 1970) (superseded
on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as recognized in Gonzalez v. United States, No 3:17-cv1011(VLB), 2018 WL 5314914 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2018)) (citing cases from the Third and
Seventh Circuits).
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Applicability of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern habeas proceedings only to the
extent that habeas proceedings have generally adhered to civil litigation
practices and to the extent that federal law, the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases, and the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings do not provide
otherwise.55 A district court explained the decisions on the applicability of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the context of class actions:
Habeas class actions are an appropriate procedural
vehicle in certain limited situations. Although habeas
actions are not strictly governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and therefore the class action provisions of the
rules do not automatically apply to habeas actions, a court
retains the power to fashion for habeas actions appropriate
means of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or
otherwise in conformity with judicial usage.56
The procedures governing the writs of habeas corpus are specified in part
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases, the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, and several provisions
of §§ 2241–2255 and 2261–2266. The federal civil rules govern motions to
vacate, set aside, or correct under § 2255, but the procedures governing writs
of habeas corpus govern applications for the writ under the savings clause57
in § 2255.
2.

General procedures

A person applying for the writ must apply in a “writing signed and verified
by the person” seeking relief or “by someone acting on his behalf.”58 The
writing must allege the facts concerning the petitioner’s custody, the name of

55. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(4); Browder, 434 U.S. at 269 (superseded on other grounds by Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
(2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-governing-section-2254-andsection-2255-proceedings.pdf, as recognized in Ukawabutu v. Morton, 997 F. Supp. 605
(D.N.J. 1998)).
56. Wang v. Reno, 862 F. Supp. 801, 811 (E.D.N.Y 1994) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1975).
57. See supra note 34 and discussion therein.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2012).
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his custodian, and, if known, the grounds on which he is held.59 The
petitioner may amend or supplement the petition under Rule 15 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.60 A statute of limitations of one year applies
to state and federal prisoners applying for federal habeas relief.61 The period
is tolled while a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other
collateral review is pending and can also be tolled for equitable reasons.62
Unless it is evident from the application itself that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief, the judge must immediately grant the writ or order the
respondent to show why it should not be granted.63 The judge must issue the
writ or order to the custodian, who has three days to file a return showing
why the petitioner is detained.64 The court may grant leave to amend the
return before or after it is filed.65 The respondent, variously described as the
jailer or the custodian, must also promptly file certified copies of the
indictment, plea of the petitioner, and the judgment, to the extent that the
copies are relevant and the petitioner did not include them in his petition.66
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1); 2255(f)(1)–(4) (2012). The period and its triggers are identical
for federal and state prisoners. The period begins on the date of the last of four possible events.
First, the period may begin on the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or when the time for seeking direct review expired. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A);
2255(f)(1). Second, if the prisoner was prevented from applying by state actions in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States, then the period begins on the date the
impediment caused by those actions is removed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B); 2255(f)(2). Third,
if the right that forms the basis for the challenge has been newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable to all cases on collateral review, the period begins on
the date the right was initially recognized by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(C);
2255(f)(3). Fourth, the period may begin on the date on which the factual predicate for the
claim could have been discovered by exercising due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(D);
2255(f)(4).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2012). In one case, the period was tolled for nine and a half
years on this basis. Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 549 (2011); see also Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.
631, 649 (2010). The Sixth Circuit refused to toll the period of limitations for one applicant,
who missed the deadline by five days, despite a litany of delays and hindrances. Hall v. Warden,
Lebanon Corr. Inst., 662 F.3d 745 (6th Cir. 2011); cf. Sherwood v. Prelesnik, 579 F.3d 581 (6th
Cir. 2009) (granting equitable tolling where petitioner conducted his post-conviction
proceedings in state court in reliance on precedent that was later overturned).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2249 (2012).
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The judge may stay any state proceeding against the petitioner that concerns
any matter involved in the habeas proceeding.67 The federal court may even
stay the execution of a death sentence if the petitioner applies for
appointment of counsel in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2).68 Any
stayed proceeding is void if carried on despite the stay.69
3.

Evidentiary Motions

AEDPA and the legislatively enacted rules of habeas procedure
contemplate three means of obtaining and presenting evidence: evidentiary
hearings, discovery, and expanding the record. AEPDA contains provisions
on evidentiary hearings, but motions for discovery and to expand the record
are governed by legislatively enacted rules. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure apply only if the district court authorizes discovery.
Under AEDPA, “evidentiary hearings are not mandatory.”70 Federal
prisoners applying for the writ under § 2255 face a low bar. The court must
grant a hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case
conclusively show” that the petition should be denied.71 But for petitions filed
under § 2254 by state prisoners, the court should grant an evidentiary hearing
only if “such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s
factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas
relief.”72 In exercising its discretion on the question of an evidentiary
hearing,73 the district court must consider the statutory standards for
granting a hearing.74 The district courts rarely grant evidentiary motions.75
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(3).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2251(b).
70. Johnson v. Mitchell, 585 F.3d 923, 934 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vroman v. Brigano,
346 F.3d 598, 606 (6th Cir. 2003)).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2012).
72. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).
73. Ryan v. Gonzalez, 568 U.S. 57, 74 (2013).
74. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 183 (2011). A district court’s decision to grant or
refuse an evidentiary hearing under § 2255(b)—which the district court “must” grant if the
statutory standard is met—is reviewed for abuse of discretion. E.g., Winthrop-Redin v. United
States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir.
2008).
75. But see United States v. Shields, Nos. 12-cr-00410-BLF-1 & 17-cv-03978-BLF, 2020 WL
353550, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2020) (denying the habeas petitioner’s motion for an
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Federal courts reviewing claims decided on the merits in state courts can
consider only “the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the
claim on the merits.”76 Under § 2254(e), the court will hold an evidentiary
hearing for a petitioner who neglected to properly develop the factual basis
of the claim in state court if the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional
error, “no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.”77 The petitioner will generally not receive a hearing
unless he also demonstrates that his claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court and that was previously unavailable, or on a factual predicate
that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.78
If the court grants a hearing, the petitioner still faces an uphill battle.
Factual determinations made in the original state court proceedings are
presumed correct, but that presumption may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence.79 The petitioner must produce the part of the record
proving his claim, or if he is unable, the federal court must order a state
official to produce the pertinent part of the record.80 If neither the petitioner
nor the state can produce it, the federal court must decide under the existing
circumstances what weight to accord to the state court’s factual
determinations.81
The court may grant discovery or direct the parties to expand the record.
The court may grant discovery for “good cause.”82 The petitioner may request
evidentiary hearing but granting his motion to supplement the record); Lockett v. Clark, No.
3:18CV325, 2020 WL 201049, at *8 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2020).
76. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B) (2012); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432–33 (2000).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Sections 2245–2250 and the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases contain additional evidentiary rules.
80. “A copy of the official records of the [s]tate court, duly certified by the clerk of such
court as a true and correct copy of the finding, judicial opinion, or other reliable written indicia
showing such a factual determination by the State court shall be admissible in the Federal court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(g).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(f).
82. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts R. 6(a) (2012
) http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-governing-section-2254-and-section-
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discovery, including interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for
production of documents.83 Discovery by state prisoners must be conducted
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,84 but the court may allow federal
prisoners to conduct discovery “in accordance with the practices and
principles of law.”85 This allows flexibility for the court to authorize discovery
according to the traditional practices relating to motions to vacate, set aside,
or correct a sentence. The court may also “direct the parties to expand the
record.”86 Letters written before the motion was filed, exhibits, answers to
interrogatories, and affidavits may be included in the record if the judge so
orders.87 The petitioner may move the court to direct that the record be
expanded.88
D.

AEDPA’s Certificate of Appealability Requirement

In habeas proceedings, the petitioner may appeal the district court’s
decision.89 In order to appeal, the petitioner must first obtain a certificate of
appealability (COA) from the district court or the court of appeals, but the
government can appeal without one.90 The Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, as well as the local rules and internal operating procedures of the
courts of appeal, govern the mechanics of the petition, appeal, and COA.91

2255-proceedings.pdf (hereinafter “28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 6”); Rules Governing Section 2255
Cases
in
the
United
States
District
Courts
R.
6(a)
(2012)

http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-governing-section-2254-andsection-2255-proceedings.pdf (hereinafter “28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 6”).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 6(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 6(b).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 6(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 6(a).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 6(a).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 7(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 7(a). It is important to distinguish between
evidentiary rulings at the district court and, for instance, motions to expand the record on
appeal. See McIntire v. Gray, No. 19-3770, 2019 WL 7882541, at *1, *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2019).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 7(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 7(b).
88. The motion may be made either to the district court before relief is granted or denied
or to the appellate court during an appeal. See United States v. Shields, Nos. 12-cr-00410-BLF1 & 17-cv-03978-BLF, 2020 WL 353550, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2020); McIntire, at *1,*5.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (2012).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(3).
91. FED. R. APP. P. 22.

342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd 63

5/14/20 9:43 AM

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

504
1.

[Vol. 14:2

AEDPA Appeals in General

The standards of review for habeas petitions on appeal are the same as
those applied in typical cases—conclusions of law de novo, and findings of
fact for clear error: “We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions
in granting or denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; we review its
factual findings for clear error.”92 Because of this standard, prisoners bringing
habeas petitions under § 2254 in a federal court of appeal must overcome the
two hurdles of deference. The first hurdle is deference to state courts. Federal
courts defer to the not unreasonable factual and legal findings of state courts,
meaning that § 2254 determinations can only be overturned if the legal
findings are contrary to or are an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, or if the factual findings are unreasonable.93 The
second hurdle is deference to the district courts. While the court reviews legal
conclusions de novo, all factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
“If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.”94
Combined, these two hurdles seriously impede petitions for the writ of
habeas corpus relying on grounds decided on the merits in state court. Claims
not considered on the merits by state courts are subject to de novo review,95
but in such cases, the federal district court’s findings of fact are reviewed only
for clear error. The upshot is that many habeas claims are reviewed, at least
in part, under two levels of highly deferential review.96
2.

Motions Treated Identically to Habeas Petitions

Motions that are not habeas petitions under either § 2254 or § 2255 may
be subject to the requirements of AEDPA. In particular, motions under Rule
60(b) that are substantially similar to habeas petitions are subject to the COA

92. Irick v. Bell, 565 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 2009).
93. Federal courts reviewing claims decided on the merits in state courts can consider only
“the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
94. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
95. Gumm v. Mitchell, 775 F.3d 345, 360 (6th Cir. 2014); Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485,
494 (6th Cir. 2009).
96. In Morris v. Carpenter, 802 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 2015), the Sixth Circuit carefully laid out
the facts and thoughtfully analyzed several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the
special considerations due such cases.
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requirement.97 Rule 59(e) motions based on the merits of a prior habeas claim
should be construed as second or successive habeas petitions.98 Other
motions that are essentially requests for habeas relief or that could be used to
circumvent AEDPA’s requirement to achieve the equivalent of habeas relief
can be subject to AEDPA provisions, including the certificate of appealability
requirement.99
3.

Certificate of Appealability

To appeal a federal district court’s denial of a claim for habeas relief, the
petitioner must first obtain a COA.100 The requirement is designed to
preserve judicial resources and prevent endless habeas litigation.101 The
relevant statute states, “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals” either from
“the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding” under § 2254 or from “the
final order in a proceeding under [§] 2255.”102 This does not include the very
rare habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.103
97. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531–32 (2005); see also Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d
1213, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 2006). For a discussion of motions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(6) in habeas cases, see Andrew P. Lopiano, Comment, Dumplings Instead of
Flowers: An Argument for a Case-by-Case Approach to FRCP 60(b)(6) Motions Predicated on a
Change in Habeas Corpus Law, 15 LIBERTY U.L. REV. (2020).
98. See Rishor v. Ferguson, 822 F.3d 482, 492 (9th Cir. 2016); Cory Wilson, Note, Rishor
v. Ferguson: The Ninth Circuit Erred in Holding that Rule 59(e) Motions are not Subject to the
Restrictions of AEDPA When Those Motions Do not Present Entirely New Claims for Habeas
Corpus Relief, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 641, 642 (2018).
99. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531–32.
100. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000).
101. Congress had good reason to create powerful barriers to endless and fruitless habeas
litigation. One case from the Ninth Circuit is illustrative:
Thirty-eight years ago, on May 26, 1980, Payton raped Pamela
Montgomery and stabbed her to death with a butcher knife. During the
frenzied attack, he also attempted to kill Patricia Pensinger and her young
son. Both survived and identified Payton as the attacker. . . . Nearly forty
years later, the parties are still litigating Payton’s conviction and sentence.
Payton v. Davis, 906 F.3d 812, 813–14 (9th Cir. 2018) (footnote omitted).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2012).
103. E.g., Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, 668 F.3d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 2012). Persons
detained awaiting trial in a state court are not detained “pursuant to a judgment of a State
court,” and may therefore apply for the writ under § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(a) (2012). A
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The statute then specifies that a COA “may issue . . . only if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,”104 and
that the COA “shall indicate which specific issue or issues” on which a
satisfactory showing has been made.105 “Despite the language of [the
statute], . . . Rule 22(b) [of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure] permits
a district judge to issue a COA.”106 If the district court denies a COA, the
petitioner may petition the court of appeals for one.107 The court of appeals
lacks jurisdiction to consider the substantive claims unless either it or the
district court first issue a COA.108 The government is not required to obtain
a COA to appeal a district court’s grant of habeas relief, and if the government
appeals, the petitioner may defend the favorable judgment with alternative
arguments and arguments rejected below without obtaining a COA.109
District courts routinely deny COAs on all claims and courts of appeal rarely
grant or expand COAs.110
E.

Certificates of Appealability and Evidentiary Motions

The language of § 2253(c) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Harbison
v. Bell demonstrate that a COA is required only for the substantive claims

person authorized by § 2255 to apply for relief may apply for a writ of habeas corpus under §
2241 if a motion under § 2255 “appears inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention,” even if he neglected to make a motion under § 2255 or he made the motion and
the court denied it. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012); Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755 (6th
Cir. 1999). This savings clause applies “only where the petitioner . . . demonstrates ‘actual
innocence.’” Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). An example would be where the Supreme Court narrowly
construes a statutory prohibition previously interpreted broadly by the courts of appeal, which
allows some prisoners to claim that they are innocent under the new interpretation.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) (2012).
106. Ryan Hagglund, Comment, Review and Vacatur of Certificate of Appealability Issued
After the Denial of Habeas Corpus Petitions, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 989, 997 (2005). See FED. R. APP.
P. 22(b).
107. 28 U.S.C.§ 2254 R. 11(a) (2012), 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 11(a) (2012).
108. Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 774 (2017).
109. Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 282–83 (2015).
110. Compare Gonser v. Braman, No. 19-1770, 2020 WL 207138, at *1–2 (6th Cir. Jan. 8,
2020), with Von Tobel v. Benedetti, No. 18-15892, 2020 WL 110514, at *1, *3, (9th Cir. Jan. 9,
2020), and O’Neill v. Baker, No. 3:11-cv-00901-MMD-CLB, 2020 WL 60235, at *1 (D. Nev.
Jan. 6, 2020).
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denied in the district court’s final order,111 but neither legal scholars nor the
federal courts of appeal have recognized this. Harbison held that a COA
“pursuant to [§ 2253(c)] is not required to appeal an order denying a request
for counsel under [18 U.S.C.] § 3599 because § 2253(c)(1)(A) governs only
final orders that dispose of a habeas corpus proceeding’s merits.”112
Underlying Harbison’s cursory treatment of the COA question are several
significant arguments bolstering the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
statute. Therefore, although few circuits have recognized it,113 a COA is not
required to appeal evidentiary rulings related to a claim for which a COA has
been granted.114 Legal scholars have not addressed the applicability of
AEDPA’s COA requirement to evidentiary motions directly related to
substantive claims certified for appeal, but the courts of appeal have. Some of
the courts of appeal have correctly applied Harbison to COAs for evidentiary
rulings, while others have not. Several have issued rulings that contradict
their own precedents. Most have cited Harbison for other propositions, but
none seem to be entirely clear on the implications for evidentiary rulings of
Harbison and its interpretation of § 2253(c).
1.

Courts of Appeal

The federal courts of appeal have adopted—and, after Harbison,
retained—interpretations of the COA requirement inconsistent with
Harbison or have not yet fully implemented its holding.115 For instance, the
Ninth Circuit is well aware of the Harbison decision: the Court of Appeals for
111. See Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009).
112. Harbison, 556 U.S. at 181 (emphasis added).
113. See infra Section II.E.1.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 6(a), R. 7(a) (2004); R. 8(a) (2009), 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 6(a), R.
7(a) (2004); R. 8(a) (2009). These rules provide for three main methods to produce evidence
in habeas proceedings: discovery, evidentiary hearings, and expansions of the record.
115. An important clarification on sources is appropriate here. The author has made the
most thorough exploration of the question that is possible given the current state of legal
research. However, it is inevitable that some decisions have been overlooked, if for no other
reason than that—as the sources cited in this section demonstrate—so many opinions address
this question neither directly nor expressly. The author was forced to resort to indirect
methods of searching for circuit and district court opinions, as well as many a magistrate
judge’s Report and Recommendation. Hence, after reviewing thousands of cases and
continually reviewing the most recent habeas decisions at all levels of the federal judiciary, this
summary seems to be the most accurate and representative summary of the current approach
of federal courts to evidentiary issues in habeas appeals. It is certainly the most comprehensive
summary to date of which the author is aware.
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the Ninth Circuit and its district courts have cited Harbison in more than
sixty decisions.116 The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the Harbison
holding must mean that a modification of a protective order does not require
a COA because the modification order is not a final order.117 Notably, the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not expressly address the
question.118
The First Circuit has yet to cite Harbison, and neither the Second nor the
Third Circuit applied its holding to evidentiary rulings. The First Circuit has
held that a COA as to whether a habeas petition was barred as untimely
necessarily included the issue of whether “discovery of [an] alleged
error . . . is a ‘factual predicate’ for the purposes of the AEDPA statute of
limitations” because the disputed issue of law had to be resolved before the
court could resolve the claim being appealed.119 The Second Circuit
considered an evidentiary ruling on appeal even though only the substantive
claim was certified.120
A Third Circuit decision from 2015 noted that the court had expressly
included “the issues of whether the District Court erred in denying an
evidentiary hearing and [the petitioner’s] request for discovery.”121 The same
court recently granted a COA on a substantive issue and remanded for an
evidentiary hearing, but the issue certified for appeal was the legal question
of “whether the District Court erred in determining that [the petitioner] was
not in custody when he filed his habeas petition.”122 The District of New
116. These decisions frequently cite Harbison for its holding respecting appointment of
counsel. E.g., Samayoa v. Davis, 928 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2019).
117. Lambright v. Ryan, 698 F.3d 808, 817 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Ghent v. Wong, 371
F. App’x 782, 784 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010); but see United States v. Winkles, 795 F.3d 1134, 1141–
42 (9th Cir. 2015).
118. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b).
119. Holmes v. Spencer, 685 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Owens v. United States,
483 F.3d 48, 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2007) (reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing without
discussing whether the evidentiary issue was certified for appeal).
120. Riley v. Noeth, No. 18-770, 2020 WL 556380, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2020).
121. United States v. Manamela, 612 F. App’x 151, 154 (3rd Cir. 2015) (citing the joint
appendix of the case and indicating that this COA was granted after August 12, 2013).
122. Johnson v. Warden McDowell FCI, No. 18-1241, 2019 WL 6321087, at *1 (3d Cir.
Nov. 26, 2019) (lacking any indication that the evidentiary ruling was specified in the COA);
see also United States v. Jackson, No. 17-2647, 2020 WL 550731, at *1 & n.1 (3d Cir. Feb. 4,
2020); Wharton v. Vaughn, 722 F. App’x 268, 270 (3d Cir. 2018) (granting a COA and
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Jersey denied all seven grounds of the petitioner’s habeas petition, including
a ground seeking an evidentiary hearing, and then denied a COA as to the
entire petition.123
The Fourth Circuit has applied Harbison’s holding on COAs in a variety
of contexts. According to the Fourth Circuit, a district court’s decision on a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis need not be certified for appeal.124
Neither does a district court order dismissing a petition or motion as an
unauthorized second or successive petition.125 The Fourth Circuit has
recognized that the following are also nonfinal orders that do not require a
COA to be appealed: (1) orders construing Rule 60(b) motions as second or
successive habeas petitions and denying them as barred by the statute of
limitations; (2) orders denying motions to alter or amend a habeas order; (3)
orders denying motions for transcripts at the government’s expense; (4)
orders denying motions for appointment of counsel; (5) orders denying
petitions as untimely; (6) orders denying petitions for failure to exhaust state
remedies; (7) orders denying motions for recusal; (8) orders denying motions
to reconsider a habeas petition; and (9) orders denying motions for
mootness.126 The Fourth Circuit reviewed the logic of Harbison in some
depth in 2015, showing that the Fourth Circuit clearly understands its

remanding for an evidentiary hearing), aff’g in part and vacating in part and remanding for an
evidentiary hearing No. 01-6049, 2012 WL 3535868 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2012). In Wharton, the
Third Circuit granted a COA and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, but the decision of
whether to grant or deny a COA is separate from the decision on the legal issue for which a
COA might be granted or denied.
123. Chippero v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, No. 3:15-cv-6272, 2020 WL 205947, at *26–
27 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2020) (unpublished).
124. E.g., Jackson v. Lewis, 771 F. App’x 316, 316 (4th Cir. 2019).
125. E.g., United States v. Barnes, 752 F. App’x 161, 161 (4th Cir. 2019).
126. E.g., Morley v. Clarke, 773 F. App’x 769, 769–70 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v.
Courtney, 773 F. App’x 704, 704–05 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Ruffin, 740 F. App’x 363,
363 (4th Cir. 2018); Cleveland v. Adger, 740 F. App’x 356, 357 (4th Cir. 2018); Garvin v.
William, 740 F. App’x 348, 348 (4th Cir. 2018); Miller v. Nohe, 740 F. App’x 378, 378 (4th Cir.
2018); United States v. Day, 746 F. App’x 212, 213 (4th Cir. 2018). All of these decisions are
designated as unpublished and reported in the Federal Appendix, but nonetheless show the
Fourth Circuit’s approach to COAs. According to the Fourth Circuit, dismissal of a petition
for failure to prosecute, failure to comply with a court order, or failure to pay a filing fee are
also nonfinal orders not subject to the COA requirement.

342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd 69

5/14/20 9:43 AM

510

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:2

implications.127 However, it appears to have never directly applied Harbison
to the applicability of the COA requirement to evidentiary rulings. At least
one Fourth Circuit district court—exercising laudable attention to detail but
neglecting to properly interpret § 2253(c)(1)–(3)—expressly granted a COA
on an evidentiary issue.128
The Fifth Circuit has held that no COA is required to appeal the denial of
an evidentiary ruling as long as the evidentiary ruling is directly related to a
certified substantive claim.129 However, in one case it inexplicably reviewed
the denial of an evidentiary hearing in the process of denying a COA on the
related substantive claim.130 It was not until 2017 that a three-judge panel of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Harbison decision to district
court evidentiary rulings.131 But the very next year, another three-judge
panel—including one of the same judges—expressly discussed denying a
COA on an evidentiary ruling.132 Other Fifth Circuit decisions held that other
nonfinal orders do not require COAs because they do not dispose of the
litigation on the merits and leave nothing but execution of the judgment.133
Nevertheless, in December 2019, the Northern District of Texas adopted a
magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied requests for an evidentiary
hearing and appointment of counsel, and then denied a COA without
indicating whether that COA would have included the requests for a hearing
and for appointment of counsel.134 That same month, a federal magistrate
127. See United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Farmer v. Booker,
791 F. App’x 415, 415 (4th Cir. 2020) (denying a COA as unnecessary because the habeas
petitioner did not challenge the basis of the district court’s decision and therefore forfeited all
his potentially effective arguments).
128. Buhs v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-14117-CIV-ROSENBURG/MAYNARD, 2018
WL 10323507, at *4 (Mar. 14, 2018).
129. Norman v. Stephens, 817 F.3d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding so without explaining
the basis for its decision).
130. Segundo v. Davis, 831 F.3d 345, 351–52 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that petitioner was
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and did not
make a sufficient showing to warrant a COA on that claim).
131. See Washington v. Davis, 715 F. App’x 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2017); see also LaFlamme v.
Davis, No. 19-40484, 2020 WL 897124, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2020) (per curiam) (explaining
that a COA is not needed to appeal an evidentiary ruling).
132. Milam v. Davis, 733 F. App’x 781, 787 (5th Cir. 2018).
133. E.g., United States v. Fulton, 780 F.3d 683, 687–88 (5th Cir. 2015).
134. Lopez-Parker v. Hale County Sheriff, No. 5:19-CV-00143-M-BQ, 2019 WL 6829048,
at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2019).
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judge in Louisiana recommended denying a COA as to “the rulings set forth
in this Report and Recommendation,” which included a ruling denying an
evidentiary hearing.135 But in early 2020, the Southern District of Texas
properly applied Harbison in refusing to consider whether a COA should
issue for the voluntary dismissal of a habeas petition.136
The Sixth Circuit has not applied Harbison to an evidentiary ruling in any
reported opinion. The court has expanded a COA “to include the issue of
whether the district court erred in denying [petitioner’s] request to depose
his postconviction appellate counsel,” but it did not specify the legal standard
for its decision.137 The Sixth Circuit has previously granted a motion to
expand a COA to include the district court’s denial of a motion to expand the
record, but this occurred before the Harbison decision.138 Another Sixth
Circuit case implied that a COA is required to appeal the denial of an
evidentiary hearing.139 In yet another case, the Sixth Circuit applied the
substantive standard of § 2253(c)(1)–(3) to determine whether a COA should
issue as to the petitioner’s motions for sanctions and to expand the record.140
In a current habeas proceeding in the Sixth Circuit, the court denied a
motion to expand the COA or clarify its scope.141 The court appears to have
implicitly held that the COA did not include the evidentiary rulings.142 The
court also denied the motion to expand the COA and either affirmed the
district court’s denial of a COA as to the evidentiary rulings or outright

135. United States v. Miller, No. 10-102-JWD-EWD, 2019 WL 7584763, at *1, *4 (M.D. La.
Dec. 31, 2019).
136. Rosillo v. Davis, No. 7:18-MC-1090, 2020 WL 806661, at *2 & n.3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 13,
2020) (relying on Harbison to dismiss a prisoner’s “Motion for Bench Warrant”—which the
prisoner later claimed was filed on his behalf by mistake—without deciding whether a COA
should issue).
137. Young v. Westbrooks, 702 F. App’x 255, 256–57 (6th Cir. 2017).
138. Jeffries v. Morgan, 446 F. App’x 777, 780 (6th Cir. 2011).
139. McKinney v. Warden, London Corr. Inst., No. 17-3723, 2018 WL 3414128, at *1 (6th
Cir. 2018).
140. Hillman v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., No. 16-4280, 2017 WL 5485454, at *3 (6th
Cir. 2017).
141. Order Denying Motion to Expand and/or Clarify the Scope of a Certificate of
Appealability, Broom v. Shoop, No. 19-3356, *3–4 (6th Cir. Sept. 3, 2019), ECF No. 16-2.
142. Id. at *4 (denying the motion to expand the COA but ignoring the alternative request
to clarify the scope of the COA as including the evidentiary rulings).
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affirmed the evidentiary rulings.143 A few months earlier, the Sixth Circuit
issued a ruling that considered an evidentiary issue on appeal even though
only the substantive claim had been certified.144 A few months later, the Sixth
Circuit denied a COA and denied motions for an evidentiary hearing and
appointment of counsel as moot,145 which implies that the court might have
considered those motions if it had granted the COA. In February 2020, the
Sixth Circuit expressly refused to order an evidentiary hearing even though
the habeas petitioner’s COA was “limited to counsel’s failure to object” to the
court’s decision to have certain testimony offered in closed court.146 None of
these decisions cited either Harbison or the “final order” language of 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)–(B).
In one recent case, the Eastern District of Michigan denied an evidentiary
hearing and several substantive claims but granted a COA without specifying
whether it included the evidentiary hearing.147 A very recent decision from
the Eastern District of Kentucky denied an evidentiary hearing and several
substantive claims for relief, then ambiguously denied a COA “as to all
issues.”148 In decisions in September and October 2019, the Sixth Circuit
expressly denied COAs for district court evidentiary rulings.149
The only Seventh Circuit case to cite Harbison is a district court decision
from early 2019 examining whether Harbison’s holding applied to a denial of
bail.150 A Seventh Circuit decision from 2005 reversed and remanded for an
evidentiary hearing without clarifying whether the COA specified the
evidentiary issue.151 The Eighth Circuit has cited Harbison for propositions

143. Id. at *2–4. The order is not sufficiently explicit to hazard a guess with reasonable
certainty.
144. Willoughby v. White, 786 F. App’x 506, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2019), aff’g sub nom
Willoughby v. Simpson, No. 08-179-DLB, 2014 WL 4269115 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 29, 2014).
145. Caraway v. Green, No. 19-5851, 2019 WL 7834329, at *1, *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2019).
146. Williams v. Burt, No. 18-1461, 2020 WL 625193, at *3, *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2020).
147. Bennett v. Warren, No. 5:12-cv-12054, 2017 WL 1344775, at *13–14 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
12, 2017).
148. United States v. Thomas, No. 6:16-cv-00262-GFVT-CJS, 2019 WL 6702550, at *2
(E.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 2019).
149. Snowden v. Bracy, No. 19-3739, 2019 WL 7834653, at *1–2; Parkin v. Rewerts, No.
19-1672, 2019 WL 6869683, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (per curiam).
150. United States v. Tartareanu, No. 2:12-CR-175-PPS-APR, 2019 WL 92600, at *1 (N.D.
Ind. Jan. 3, 2019).
151. Dalton v. Battaglia, 402 F.3d 729, 739 (7th Cir. 2005).
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not related to certificates of appealability.152 It has also noted that Harbison
applies to COAs for rulings on motions for funds to conduct a mental
examination.153 In 2013, the Eighth Circuit granted a COA for an evidentiary
motion.154 It recently remanded a § 2255 petition for an evidentiary hearing
after asserting jurisdiction under § 2253 but said nothing about a COA. 155
Neither the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit nor its district courts
have applied the Harbison holding to evidentiary rulings. Before 2009, the
Ninth Circuit ruled on an evidentiary issue for which a COA had expressly
and specifically been granted156 and implied it had the power to expand a
COA to include evidentiary rulings by the district court.157 After the Harbison
decision, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have continued to issue COAs
that expressly include evidentiary rulings.158 At least one Ninth Circuit
decision found that a specific evidentiary issue was “encompassed” within the
COA despite it not having been specifically mentioned in the COA.159 In fact,
at least two Ninth Circuit decisions reversed and remanded the respective
district courts for an evidentiary hearing after granting a COA solely for the

152. E.g., McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-cv-00179-KGB, 2017 WL 1399554, at *13
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2017).
153. Edwards v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 462 (8th Cir. 2012).
154. Purkey v. United States, 729 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2013); see also Rhodes v. Smith,
No. 18-3581, 2020 WL 873252, at *2 (8th Cir. Feb. 24, 2020) (noting that the district court
granted a COA as to its denial of the petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing).
155. Dat v. United States, 920 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 2019).
156. Collier v. McDaniel, 253 F. App’x 689, 691–92 (9th Cir. 2007).
157. Lilly v. Lewis, 151 F. App’x 579, 582 (9th Cir. 2005); Tuggle v. Campbell, 261 F. App’x
56, 58 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Harris v. Sharp, 941 F.3d 962, 1011–12 (10th Cir. 2019).
158. E.g., Love v. Scribner, No. 06cv640, 2010 WL 1031302, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2010)
(granting a COA on the district court’s ruling on admission of an interview transcript under
Habeas Rule 7); Graves v. Swarthout, 471 F. App’x 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The remaining
certified issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary
hearing on the other two certified issues.”); Floyd v. Baker, No. 2:06–cv–0471, 2014 WL
7240060, at *5 (D. Nev. Dec. 17, 2014) (holding that the petitioner met the standard for a COA
for the denial of a prior motion for an evidentiary hearing).
159. Kemp v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245, 1259 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011).
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substantive claim160 and a third decision expressly noted the possibility of
doing so.161
However, as late as September 2018, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California, citing the Supreme Court habeas decision
Ayestas v. Davis, chose “in an abundance of caution” to grant COAs on its
denials of various evidentiary rulings, including requests for discovery and
evidentiary hearings.162 In December 2019, the Southern District of
California denied a substantive claim and a request for appointment of
counsel, and then denied a COA without noting whether the COA it denied
would have covered the request for appointment of counsel as well.163 In
August 2019, a federal magistrate judge of the Western District of
Washington expressly recommended denying a COA for a request for an
evidentiary hearing.164 Another late 2019 case expressly denied a COA “as to
. . . the requests for factual development, record expansion, and an
evidentiary hearing.”165 And in January 2020, after a district court denied
substantive relief and an evidentiary hearing but granted a COA on multiple
substantive claims,166 the Ninth Circuit—addressing only one claim—denied
relief but reconsidered the evidentiary ruling in considerable detail.167
A three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit recently granted a COA on
whether a habeas petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
claims,168 but another panel simultaneously denied a COA on a substantive
160. Kon v. Sherman, No. 18-55401, 2020 WL 507936, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2020), opinion
withdrawn and superseded on denial of rehear’g 787 Fed. App’x 460, 462 (9th Cir. 2019)
(reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing); Cuevas Espinoza v. Spearman, 661 F.
App’x 910, 914–15 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing).
161. Floyd v. Filson, No. 14-99012, 2020 WL 579189, at *6 n.3 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2020).
162. Jurado v. Davis, No. 08cv1400, 2018 WL 4405418, at *159 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018)
(citing Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080, 1088 n.1 (2018)).
163. Maraglino, v. Espinoza, No. 19cv0109 LAB (KSC), 2019 WL 6829262, at *1, *30–32
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2019).
164. Zellmer v. Holbrook, No. C17-1776 RSM-BAT, 2019 WL 6879316, at *4 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 7, 2019); see also Duffey v. Uttecht, No. 3:19-CV-5694-RBL-DWC, 2019 WL 6829052, at
*2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2019).
165. Catlin v. Davis, No. 1:07-cv-01466-LJO-SAB, 2019 WL 6885017, at *278 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 17, 2019).
166. Cook v. Kernan, 948 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’g in part No. C 15-06343 WHA,
2017 WL 4516837 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2017).
167. Cook, 948 F.3d at 970.
168. Harmon v. Sharp, 936 F.3d 1044, 1055 (10th Cir. 2019).
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claim and affirmed the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on
that claim.169 A few days after declining to issue a COA in one breath and
affirming the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing in the next,170
the Tenth Circuit dealt with a request for a COA on, inter alia, the district
court’s denial of a motion to object, compel, and sanction. Citing Harbison
equivocally, the court held the following as alternative bases for denying
relief: the district court did not abuse its discretion, the standard for a COA
was not met, and “even if a COA were not required, . . . [there was] no
error.”171 Another Tenth Circuit decision expressly discussed its decision to
deny a COA on the petitioner’s claim that the district court erred by refusing
to grant an evidentiary hearing.172 Another recent decision reversed and
remanded a petition to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.173 Two
decisions at the end of 2019 denied a COA on all claims and additionally
denied “petitioner’s requests to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to
appoint counsel.”174 The Tenth Circuit has also expressly denied a COA as to
an evidentiary hearing.175
The Tenth Circuit has thus, in one year, held that a COA must specifically
and expressly include evidentiary rulings, then seemingly decided that it need
not, then, after discovering the guiding star of Harbison, got into a muddle
and could not make up its mind. But in early 2020, the Tenth Circuit
expressly recognized Harbison’s key decision by relying on Harbison to hold
that “[a]n order denying recusal is a collateral order that does not require a
COA for appeal,”176 nor does an “order denying [a] motion to disqualify on
the merits” nor an order denying reconsideration of a denial of a Rule 59(e)
169. Tafoya v. Martinez, 787 F. App’x 501, 502, 505 (10th Cir. 2019).
170. Rippey v. Utah, 783 F. App’x 823, 824–28 (10th Cir. 2019). In June 2019, another panel
of the Tenth Circuit denied a COA and at the same time affirmed the district court’s denial of
an evidentiary hearing. Glasser v. McCall, 780 F. App’x, 564, 566 (10th Cir. 2019).
171. Phipps v. Raemisch, No. 18-1396, 2019 WL 5801698, at *1, *3, *6 n.9, *10–11 (10th
Cir. Nov. 7, 2019) (citing Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009)).
172. Gay v. Foster, 791 F. App’x 748, 752–53 (10th Cir. 2019) (denying a COA on the
petitioner’s second question—whether the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to
develop the factual basis for one of his substantive claims—and applying the reasonable jurist
standard).
173. Harris v. Sharp, 941 F.3d 962, 1012 (10th Cir. 2019).
174. May v. Heimgartner, No. 19-3206, 2019 WL 6358286, at *5 (10th Cir. Nov. 27, 2019);
Collum v. Benzon, 788 F. App’x 586, 589 (10th Cir. 2019).
175. Borden v. Bryant, 786 F. App’x 843, 846–47 (10th Cir. 2019).
176. Vreeland v. Zupan, No. 19-1244, 2020 WL 402271, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 2020).
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motion.177 It remains to be seen when the Tenth Circuit will recognize
Harbison’s specific relevance to evidentiary rulings on appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit recently denied habeas relief on appeal after
considering two issues that had been certified by the district court, one of
which was “whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Davis’s
request to employ [a] stay and abeyance procedure.”178 The district court had
granted the petitioner’s motion to expand the COA to specifically include the
stay and abeyance.179 Another district court in the Eleventh Circuit, after
having “determined that the [moving party] is not entitled to relief on the
merits,” ambiguously denied a COA as to all other “issues presented” in the
petition, potentially including the petitioner’s request for an evidentiary
hearing.180 But in another Eleventh Circuit case, the magistrate
recommended denying relief and a COA,181 the district court affirmed in part
and denied an evidentiary hearing but granted a COA on a substantive
claim,182 and a panel of the Eleventh Circuit expressly reviewed the district
court’s ruling denying an evidentiary hearing.183 Interestingly, the Southern
District of Florida routinely cites Harbison for the comparatively mundane
proposition that habeas petitioners must obtain a COA to appeal.184
The Federal Circuit and the District of Columbia have cited Harbison for
propositions related to statutory interpretation.185 In the recently issued
opinion in the case In re N.H.M., the D.C. Circuit applied Harbison to “orders

177. United States v. Rice, No. 19-6149, 2020 WL 729533, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 2020).
178. Davis v. Sellers, 940 F.3d 1175, 1179 (11th Cir. 2019).
179. Id. at 1185.
180. Diaz v. United States, No. 16-CIV-24126-ALTONAGA, 2018 WL 10150923, at *7
(S.D. Fla, Jan. 2, 2018).
181. Gaines v. Florida Comm’n on Offender Review, No. 4:14-cv-588-RH-GRJ, 2018 WL
3242698, at *9–10 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2018).
182. Id. at *2.
183. Gaines v. Attorney Gen., 788 F. App’x 623, 627–29 (11th Cir. 2019).
184. See, e.g., Mack v. United States, No. 17-23791-CV-SCOLA, 2019 WL 7834002, at *9
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2019); Demosthene v. United States, No. 18-22314-CIV-ALTONAGA,
2018 WL 10398361, at *18 (S.D. Fla. July 2, 2018). Numerous habeas opinions from the
Southern District of Florida have a COA section (generally a paragraph) near the very end of
the opinion that appears to be basically copied and pasted from opinion to opinion.
185. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923, 935 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(Reyna, J., dissenting); Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Abraxis
Bioscience, LLC v. Kappos, 10 F. Supp. 3d 53, 87–88, 88 n.27 (D.D.C. 2014).
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defining the scope of paid representation.”186 The court applied the collateral
order doctrine and decided to review an order denying compensation to an
indigent petitioner’s attorney.187 The D.C. Circuit recognized that COAs are
not required for nonfinal orders188 but apparently has not applied Harbison
to evidentiary rulings.
Of the circuits that have applied Harbison outside of the context of federal
funds for indigent petitioners, only one has applied its holding to evidentiary
rulings. Even that court—the Fifth Circuit—hasissued contradictory rulings
on the applicability of the COA requirement to evidentiary rulings. The
Ninth Circuit seems aware that its COA jurisprudence may not be in line
with Supreme Court precedent, but has not resolved its confusion. In
summary, nearly every federal circuit court of appeals and its district courts
are confused on this question or have yet to realize that a petitioner may
appeal an evidentiary ruling if the related substantive claim has been certified
for appeal.
2.

Legal Scholarship

Some scholarly articles have cited Harbison for propositions relating to
indigent defense.189 More have cited it in discussions of statutory
interpretation.190 Few have cited it for its holding on COAs, and most of those
scholars have cited it only for the narrow proposition that no COA is

186. See In re N.H.M., Nos. 16-FS-1289 & 16-FS-1290, 2020 WL 579001, at *3 (D.C. Feb.
6, 2020) (citing Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 182–83 (2009); Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459
(5th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Harbison, 556 U.S. 180).
187. Id. at *2–3.
188. Id. at *3.
189. E.g., Angela A. Allen-Bell, A Prescription for Healing a National Wound: Two Doses of
Executive Direct Action Equals a Portion of Justice and a Serving of Redress for America & the
Black Panther Party, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 1, 62–63, 63 n.285 (2015); Lee
Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 89 n.139 (2011); Leah M. Litman,
Officiating Removal, 164 U. PA. L. REV. Online 33, 40 n.48 (2015).
190. E.g., June M. Besek & Owen W. Keiter, Capitol Records v. Vimeo: The Peculiar Case
of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings and Federal Copyright Law, 41 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 559, 582
n.140 (2018); James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 901, 902
n.4 (2011); James N. Duca, Now Where Did that Mortgage Note Go? A Two-Act Play Under
U.C.C. § 3-301 and 11 U.S.C. § 1141(C), 16 Haw. B. J. 71, 80 n.42 (2013); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441,
464–65 n.130 (2013); R. George Wright, Constitutional Cases and the Four Cardinal Virtues,
60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 195, 207 n.79 (2012).
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required to appeal the denial of counsel appointed under 28 U.S.C. § 3599.191
They recognize that Harbison is not primarily about federal habeas COAs—
it is about federal funding for indigent defense: “[i]n an unusual twist, both
parties and all the amici agree[d] that a certificate of appealability was not
necessary in this case.”192 The Court dispensed with the COA question in a
very brief section at the beginning of the opinion. That is why so many courts
and scholars have failed to realize the significant of Harbison to COAs on
evidentiary rulings. Other scholarly works that cited Harbison discussed
COAs and appellate jurisdiction,193 nonfinal orders other than evidentiary
rulings,194 or other concepts unrelated to COAs for evidentiary rulings.195
Of the two scholarly articles that have cited Harbison and delved deeply
into the intricacies of COAs, both omitted any mention of discovery and
motions to expand the record, and both mentioned evidentiary hearings only
in passing in a footnote.196 A student article on Harbison written before it was
decided focused exclusively on the appointment of counsel issues and
expressly disclaimed any intent to discuss the COA requirement.197 An
annually issued piece on habeas corpus law in 2018 cited Harbison but did
not apply its holding to evidentiary matters.198 West’s Federal Forms includes
a “Petition for Certificate of Appealability—Extended Version” that requests
a COA on two issues—the second of which is the district court’s denial of
191. See Carol Garfiel Freeman, Supreme Court Cases of Interest, 24 CRIM. JUST. 48, 51
(2009); Kovarsky, supra note 189, at 89 n.139; John F. Blevins et al., United States Supreme
Court Update, 21 APP. ADVOC. 278, 289 (2009); Litman, supra note 189, at 40 n.48.
192. Kathy Swedlow, Can a Federally Appointed Lawyer Represent a Capital Defendant in
State Clemency Proceedings?, 36 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 242, 243 (2009). This article’s
entire discussion of the COA issues consists of a brief paragraph. Id.
193. See, e.g., Hagglund, supra note 106.
194. David Goodwin, An Appealing Choice: An Analysis of and a Proposal for Certificates
of Appealability in “Procedural” Habeas Appeals, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 791, 819 n.118,
832 n.182 (2013).
195. Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay in
Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 620–21 n.166 (2010).
196. Jonah J. Horwitz, Certifiable: Certificates of Appealability, Habeas Corpus, and the
Perils of Self-Judging, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 695, 704 n.39 (2012); Margaret A. Upshaw,
Comment, The Unappealing State of Certificates of Appealability, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1609, 1612
n.25 (2015).
197. See Sarah Rutledge, Note, Harbison v. Bell, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR
215, 215 n.1 (2009).
198. Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1045, 1088
n.2868, 1100–01, 1101 n.2916 (2018).
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discovery.199 The Corpus Juris Secundum section on COAs does not discuss
this issue at all.200
Under Harbison, no COA is required to appeal an order other than a
nonfinal order to evidentiary rulings. No scholarly work has discussed
Harbison’s impact on COAs for evidentiary rulings. Very few cases have
addressed the question of Harbison’s impact on COAs outside the context of
motions for federally appointed counsel. As indicated above, the Ninth
Circuit is confused as to whether COAs must specifically include evidentiary
rulings. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has not cited Harbison, and the
Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal have not applied Harbison to
COAs for evidentiary rulings. The Sixth Circuit has issued contradictory
rulings. The courts of appeal that have not already done so should directly
apply Harbison to hold that a COA is not required to appeal an evidentiary
ruling that is directly related to a substantive claim certified for appeal.
III. THE COA REQUIREMENT
If a petitioner’s substantive claim has been certified for appeal, he may
appeal related evidentiary rulings even if the COA does not specifically
include it. The text of § 2253(c)(1)–(3) demands this interpretation. The
Supreme Court’s ruling in Harbison made explicit what some circuits
recognized independently, but none of the courts of appeal have consistently
or perfectly applied Harbison’s holding to evidentiary issues. Sometimes, the
court cannot properly reach the substantive claim without resolving related
evidentiary issues. If the courts recognize that no COA is required for
evidentiary issues, petitioners will be able to raise additional issues before the
appellate courts and therefore have a greater chance of obtaining relief. In
light of the barriers and obstacles to relief AEDPA has imposed, this
interpretation will serve an important moderating influence.
A.

Text of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(3)

The best interpretation of AEDPA’s COA provision is that it does not
require that evidentiary rulings be specifically certified to be appealed.
Despite the provision’s requirement that a COA “indicate which specific

199. 1C WEST’S FED. FORMS, COURT OF APPEALS § 6:5 (6th ed.).
200. 39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 487 (Feb. 2020); see also id. at § 509 (discussing the power
of federal courts of appeal to remand to the district courts for evidentiary hearings but relying
mostly on cases that pre-date AEDPA).
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issue or issues” is certified for appeal,201 the language of the statute supports
this interpretation. Only “final order[s]” need to be certified for appeal,202 and
to obtain a COA the petitioner must make a “substantial showing [that he
has been denied] a constitutional right.”203 Neither of these requirements
makes sense when applied to evidentiary rulings and other nonfinal orders.
The relevant part of the statute reads as follows:
(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of
appeals from—
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in
which the detention complained of arises out of
process issued by a State court; or
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section
2255.
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph
(1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall
indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing
required by paragraph (2).204
1.

“Final Order”

Citing § 2253(c)(1)(A), the Supreme Court in Harbison held that since a
motion to appoint counsel or to enlarge the authority of counsel is not a “final
order,” the petitioner did not need a COA to appeal it.205 The Harbison
Court’s interpretation was based on a straightforward application of the
“final order” language of the statute to the order being appealed. A final order
“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment.”206 In habeas proceedings, a final order is an order
201. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) (2012).
202. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)–(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
203. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(3) (2012).
205. Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009).
206. Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs and
Participating Emp’r, 571 U.S. 177, 183 (2014).
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disposing of a petition on the merits.207 Other orders and rulings do not
require a COA, including orders appointing or denying appointment of
counsel208 and orders denying motions for a bizarre writ “to order state
officials not to interfere with the gathering of information in support of
clemency.”209
Evidentiary rulings are typically not final orders. An evidentiary ruling is
a final order only if the district court intended that the matter be practically
closed or if the district court had nothing left to do to resolve the case,210 but
this circumstance probably is not even possible and has likely never occurred.
However, the collateral order doctrine applies in habeas cases.211 The
collateral order doctrine allows certain orders that do not dispose of a claim
on the merits to be appealed by construing “final order” to include orders
that do not dispose of a case but “conclusively resolv[e]” claims collateral to
the “rights asserted in the action.”212 For example, a district court’s order
denying a motion to reconsider its protective order restricting the use of
certain evidence in a habeas proceeding is a collateral order.213
Although an evidentiary ruling can be issued in a final or collateral order
and thus be subject to the COA requirement, most evidentiary orders are
neither final nor collateral. Like motions to appoint or enlarge the authority
of counsel, they do not dispose of the case on the merits and they do not
resolve claims collateral to the rights asserted in the petitioner’s substantive
claims. The Harbison Court applied a straightforward interpretation of the
provision. The matter was so clear that both parties and the United States as
amicus conceded that no COA was required.214 This straightforward
interpretation requires the same result for nonfinal and non-collateral
evidentiary rulings.
2.

“Denial of Constitutional Right”

The statute says that “[t]he certificate of appealability . . . shall indicate
[the] specific issue or issues” on which “the applicant has made a substantial
207. Swanson v. DeSantis, 606 F.3d 829, 832 (6th Cir. 2010).
208. Harbison, 556 U.S. at 183.
209. Baze v. Parker, 632 F.3d 338, 340–41 (6th Cir. 2011).
210. See Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2008).
211. See, e.g., Ghent v. Wong, 371 F. App’x 782 (9th Cir. 2010).
212. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (citation omitted).
213. Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2002).
214. Rutledge, supra note 197, at 215 n.4.
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showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”215 This language is
inconsistent with the typical standard of review for evidentiary rulings, which
is abuse of discretion.216 Nearly every circuit applies the abuse of discretion
standard to habeas evidentiary rulings but reviews the district court’s
substantive analysis de novo.217 A district court’s denial of a COA is also
reviewed de novo.218 By applying these distinct standards of review, the
circuits therefore recognize that evidentiary rulings are separate and distinct
from the underlying substantive claims on which a COA must be obtained.219
Additionally, it would be odd to deny appellate review of an evidentiary
ruling based on the petitioner’s failure to make a substantial showing that the
district court, by denying his evidentiary motion, violated one of his
constitutional rights. Denying an evidentiary motion might conceivably
violate a petitioner’s constitutional rights in rare circumstances, but generally
does not. A few cases have applied a paraphrase of this standard: whether
reasonable jurists would agree with the district court’s decision.220 Although
this judicially crafted test sounds apropos when applied to determining
whether a COA should issue as to an evidentiary ruling, the language of the
statute governs. Just because a reasonable jurist might disagree with the
215. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)–(3) (2012).
216. Even though the district court “must” grant an evidentiary hearing to federal prisoners
petitioning under § 2255 unless the record conclusively shows that the prisoner is not entitled
to relief, the court’s decision to hold or refuse such a hearing is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. E.g., Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2008). District court rulings that dispose of a claim
on the merits for procedural rather than substantive reasons are reviewed under a
modification of the reasonable jurist standard. Under this modified standard, a COA will issue
if a reasonable jurist would debate both the procedural ruling and the merits of the substantive
claim. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
217. E.g., Dat v. United States, 920 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 2019); Cornwell v. Bradshaw,
559 F.3d 398, 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2009). Another example: “We review the district court’s denial
of an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion,” but denial of the substantive claims is
reviewed de novo. Black v. Carpenter, 866 F.3d 734, 742, 743 (6th Cir. 2017). Et cetera, ad
infinitum. Or, as the Bluebook would have it, see, e.g., Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 622, 625
(6th Cir. 2011).
218. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 483–84.
219. The Eleventh Circuit recently considered a habeas petition for which the district court
had committed the very rare error of applying the reasonable jurist standard to a nonfinal
order. Davis v. Sellers, 940 F.3d 1175, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that the district court
granted a motion to expand a COA to include a motion for a stay and abeyance).
220. See Collier v. McDaniel, 253 F. App’x 689, 691–92 (9th Cir. 2007).
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district court’s evidentiary ruling does not mean that the district court
probably violated the petitioner’s constitutional right and therefore satisfied
the standard in § 2253(c). For instance, denying a procedural motion does
not necessarily result in a deprivation of constitutional rights. The same is
true of another judicial paraphrase of the standard: whether the “the issues
presented [are] adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”221
This judicially crafted paraphrase is helpful in applying the substantive
standard, but, without reference to the text of § 2253(c)(1)–(3), it can mislead
courts—or clerks fresh from law school upon whom judges rely extensively
for legal research and drafting opinions—to believe that evidentiary or other
issues might need separate consideration for a COA.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the reasonable jurist standard applies
to procedural rulings if the district court dismissed the petition solely on
procedural grounds.222 At first glance, this standard would seem as
inappropriate to procedural issues as to evidentiary issues. It might be
inferred that since this standard can apply to procedural issues, it can also
reasonably apply to evidentiary issues. However, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the “substantial showing” language of § 2253(c)(2)—for which
the reasonable jurist test is a paraphrase and supplement—was designed by
Congress to codify the judicially created standard for granting a certificate of
probable cause under the habeas scheme that existed before AEDPA was
enacted.223 Under the prior standard, evidentiary rulings were reviewed for
abuse of discretion and procedural rulings that prevented the district court
from reaching the merits of a habeas claim received a COA based upon the
“substantial showing” standard and its supplementary paraphrase, the
reasonable jurist test.224 Also, the district court may issue a final order based
solely on a procedural ruling alone but never on an evidentiary ruling alone.
It is therefore appropriate that procedural rulings can be subject to the COA
requirement, but evidentiary rulings are not.

221. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 484–85. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893–94.
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Other Cases Interpreting and Applying § 2253(c)

Although only the Fifth Circuit has applied Harbison to evidentiary
rulings—and even that court subsequently contradicted itself225—most
circuits have applied Harbison or its underlying interpretation of § 2253(c)
to nonfinal orders of some sort. According to the Fourth Circuit, a district
court’s decision on a motion to proceed in forma pauperis need not be
certified for appeal.226 Neither does a district court order dismissing a petition
or motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition.227 The Fourth
Circuit ruled similarly on a variety of other orders.228 The Fifth Circuit held
that no COA was required to appeal an order transferring a second or
successive habeas petition to the court of appeals for authorization.229 The
Sixth Circuit held that no COA is required to appeal the denial of a motion
for a bizarre writ “to order state officials not to interfere with the gathering
of information in support of clemency.”230 Three Ninth Circuit cases cited
Harbison and applied its holding to nonfinal district court orders, including
modified protective orders and the denial of a true Rule 60(b) motion for
relief from a judgment.231 Most district court decisions that deny evidentiary
motions and grant or deny a COA never mention whether the evidentiary
rulings are or need to be separately evaluated for a COA.232
Among the circuits, there is considerable confusion but no substantive
debate. Most of the circuits recognize that nonfinal orders do not need a COA
to be appealed, but few have applied that understanding to evidentiary
rulings directly related to substantive claims that have been certified for
appeal. The principles that led the circuits to hold as they did in the cases
225. See Milam v. Davis, 733 F. App’x 781, 787 (5th Cir. 2018); Washington v. Davis, 715
F. App’x 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2017).
226. E.g., Jackson v. Lewis, 771 F. App’x 316, 316 (4th Cir. 2019).
227. E.g., United States v. Barnes, 752 F. App’x 161, 161 (4th Cir. 2019).
228. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
229. United States v. Fulton, 780 F.3d 683, 684–85, 687–88 (5th Cir. 2015).
230. Baze v. Parker, 632 F.3d 338, 340–41 (6th Cir. 2011).
231. United States v. Winkles, 795 F.3d 1134, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2015); Lambright v. Ryan,
698 F.3d 808, 817 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a district court’s order on a modified
protective order was appealable without a COA); Ghent v. Wong, 371 F. App’x 782, 784 n.1
(9th Cir. 2010) (applying the collateral order doctrine to a modified protective order).
232. See, e.g., United States v. Diggs, No. 1:15-CR-166, 2019 WL 5445663, at *1, *9 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 24, 2019); Hotton v. United States, Nos. 12-CR-0649(JS) & 17-CV-4440(JS), 2019
WL 5310673, at *1, *12, *15–16 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019).
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cited above should lead them to rule similarly in future habeas cases involving
appellate review of evidentiary rulings.
4.

COAs Should Not Be Unduly Limited

Because COAs should not be limited unnecessarily, federal courts of
appeal should allow petitioners to challenge related evidentiary issues even if
the COA does not specifically and expressly include them. Interpreting §
2253(c) as requiring a COA to appeal a final order but not as requiring the
COA to specify related evidentiary issues is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s concern that lower courts are unduly restricting habeas petitions
through the COA requirement. AEDPA was enacted to circumscribe the
ability of petitioners to waste judicial resources by using federal habeas
corpus law to present repeated and non-meritorious claims for
postconviction relief. The AEDPA standards were “meant to be” difficult to
satisfy.233 AEDPA contained necessary reforms, but its restrictions justly give
rise to concerns for the rights of prisoners. AEDPA’s strict requirements and
procedural bars make it harder for prisoners to bring petitions and make it
easier for judges to deny them.234
Because denying petitions is routine and because issuing a COA inherently
questions the district court’s judgment—and because most habeas petitions
should not succeed on the merits—most federal magistrate and district court
judges are loath to recommend or to grant a COA. Denying habeas relief in
close and questionable cases threatens the treasured right of individual liberty
and the panoply of individual constitutional rights against improper criminal
prosecution, conviction, and punishment. Because AEDPA effectively bars
frivolous habeas petitions and promotes swift termination of nonmeritorious claims, it may also make it unduly difficult for petitioners to
succeed on meritorious claims. Therefore, district courts and courts of appeal
should be more receptive to requests for COAs.
In 2003, the Supreme Court explained that a court “should not [deny] . . . a
COA merely because it believes the applicant will not . . . ” prevail on
appeal.235 Worried that the lower courts were misinterpreting its holding in
Slack v. McDaniel in 2000 and unduly restricting COAs, the Court noted that

233. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
234. See generally supra, Sections II.A–D.
235. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003).
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a COA could only be granted where the district court denied the relief and
success on appeal was therefore unlikely.236 The Court went on:
We do not require petitioner to prove, before the issuance of
a COA, that some jurists would grant the petition for habeas
corpus. Indeed, a claim can be debatable even though every
jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted
and the case has received full consideration, that petitioner
will not prevail.237
The Court also warned the lower courts not to deny petitions and then
unconsciously allow their opinion on whether the claim should prevail to
color their judgment on whether a COA should issue, which is judged by a
different standard.238 Because the lower courts may have unduly limited
habeas petitions through the COA requirement, federal courts of appeal
should allow petitioners to challenge related evidentiary issues even if the
COA does not specifically and expressly include them.
B.

Evidentiary Issues as Included in Substantive Issues

An alternative basis for concluding that § 2253(c) does not require a COA
to expressly and specifically include evidentiary rulings is that at least some
evidentiary issues are included in substantive issues. Although the statute
says that the COA “shall indicate which specific issue or issues” are
included,239 some of the courts of appeal have held that some issues and
arguments are included in other issues. Therefore, a COA need not specify
such issues and arguments as certified for appeal. These issues and arguments
could relate to evidentiary rulings.
In Steele v. Randle, the Sixth Circuit held that arguments that address a
claim that has been certified for appeal need not be specified in the COA.240
Steele filed a petition after the one-year statute of limitations ran, but the
respondent failed to raise the issue in its return.241 The district court sua
sponte dismissed the petition on the basis of the statute of limitations but

236. Id. (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
237. Id. at 338.
238. Id. at 336–37.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3).
240. Steele v. Randle, 37 F. App’x 162, 164–65 (6th Cir. 2002).
241. Id. at 164.
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issued a COA as to whether the petition was time-barred.242 On appeal, the
respondent claimed that Steele could argue that the petition was not timebarred, but could not argue that the district court did not have the authority
on its own initiative to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.243 The Sixth
Circuit reasoned that the district court’s “authority to sua sponte dismiss a
petition as time-barred is inherently intertwined with its decision that the
petition did not meet the one-year statute of limitations.”244 In Phillips v.
White, the Sixth Circuit similarly held that where the district court issues a
COA as to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the closely related issue
of whether to apply a presumption that the petitioner was prejudiced by the
ineffective assistance of counsel245 is part and parcel of that claim and
therefore included in the COA.246
The First Circuit has held that a COA as to the timeliness of a petition
necessarily included the issue of whether “discovery of [an] alleged
error . . . is a ‘factual predicate’ for the purposes of the AEDPA statute of
limitations . . . .”247 The disputed issue of law had to be resolved before the
court could resolve the claim being appealed. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has
held that if a procedural question must be resolved before the court can
consider the merits of a constitutional claim certified for appeal, and if the
district court was silent on the procedural question, the court of appeals “will
assume that the COA also encompasses any procedural claims that must be
addressed on appeal.”248 In a footnote, another Ninth Circuit case declared
that in that case it interpreted a COA to include the denial of a related
evidentiary motion but gave no explanation and cited no authority.249 If a
related issue—including an evidentiary issue—necessarily must be resolved
before the certified issue can be resolved (such as a threshold procedural

242. Id.
243. Id. 164–65.
244. Id.
245. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 649, 666–67 (1984).
246. Phillips v. White, 851 F.3d 567, 580–81 (6th Cir. 2017). Petitioners claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel must prove that the alleged ineffective assistance prejudiced their
defense. See id. at 580–81.
247. Holmes v. Spencer, 685 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2012)
248. Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000).
249. Kemp v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245, 1259 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011).

342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd 87

5/14/20 9:43 AM

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

528

[Vol. 14:2

issue), or if resolving the related issue is a necessary part of resolving the
certified issue, then the COA includes the related issue.250
C.

Practical Benefits to Habeas Petitioners

If the courts apply Harbison’s interpretation of § 2253(c) to evidentiary
rulings, some habeas petitioners will benefit considerably, while others will
remain unaffected. Because the courts of appeal can sua sponte expand a
COA to include related issues, adopting a different interpretation of § 2254(c)
would still leave the courts of appeal the discretion to address evidentiary
issues not certified for appeal but which petitioners raise and brief. But under
the interpretation advocated in this article, the federal appellate courts could
be forced to address evidentiary issues they might otherwise ignore or
summarily deny. The government is not required to obtain a COA to appeal
a district court’s grant of habeas relief, but if the government appeals, the
petitioner may employ arguments rejected below to defend the favorable
judgment, and need not first obtain a COA.251 Therefore, this interpretation
does not affect petitioners who successfully petition for the writ but whose
favorable judgment is appealed by a state or the federal government.
1.

Ability to Expand COAs is Unaffected

The court of appeals may expand a COA.252 The court may do so sua
sponte or on a motion by the petitioner.253 A notice of appeal may be treated
as a motion to grant or expand a COA if it includes issues not already
certified.254 The interpretation of § 2253(c) adopted in Harbison and
advocated here does not affect the ability of the circuit courts to expand or
grant COAs. The courts of appeal may continue to issue and expand COAs
on motion by the petitioner and to expand COAs sua sponte. On this point,
the current procedures would remain unaffected.

250. See Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 408 n.68 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 877 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004); Wright v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 278 F.3d
1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2002).
251. Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 282–83 (2015).
252. See Young v. Westbrooks, 702 F. App’x 255, 256–57 (6th Cir. 2017); Collier v.
McDaniel, 253 F. App’x 689, 691–92 (9th Cir. 2007).
253. See Young, 702 F. App’x at 256–57 (6th Cir. 2017).
254. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000) (citing F ED. R. APP. P. 22(b); FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(f); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 240 (1998)).
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Right to Raise Issues on Appeal

Habeas petitioners would benefit from the interpretation of § 2253(c)
adopted in Harbison and advocated here because they would gain the right
to force the court of appeals to directly and fully address evidentiary issues
related to the substantive claims raised on appeal. Because a COA need not
specifically include evidentiary or other nonfinal and non-collateral orders,
the petitioner could obtain appellate review of those orders as a matter of
right anytime they obtained appellate review of directly related substantive
claims. The upshot is that habeas petitioners whose claims are sufficiently
meritorious to warrant appellate review would have more issues to appeal
and therefore another chance to convince the court to hear favorable
evidence, which in turn increases their chances of obtaining relief on a
substantive claim. Evidentiary hearings are frequently sought but rarely
granted.255 Under this interpretation of § 2253(c), they could be more
frequently obtained.
IV. CONCLUSION
Deliberately throwing the innocent in jail is no longer fashionable, and our
legal system emphasizes the horror of punishing the innocent over the
problem of letting the guilty go free. Unfortunately, the system is abused and
mistakes happen. Innocent people go to jail, and some of the guilty are
imprisoned in violation of their constitutional rights and our nation’s
common values. The Great Writ, limited as it is under AEDPA, is still a
powerful weapon to wield against improper convictions and illegal
sentences—against unjust punishment. If the courts of appeal recognize that
the language of § 2253(c)(1)–(3) gives petitioners the right to appellate review
of evidentiary issues directly related to substantive habeas claims certified for
appeal, the truth can be ascertained with greater certainty and more of the
innocent will go free. Lady Justice would be proud.

255. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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